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Statutory and Judicial Approaches to Gray Market
Goods: The "Material Differences" Standard
Lynda J. Oswald'
G RAY market transactions can assume a myriad of different forms.' In the
most basic sense, gray market goods (also called "parallel imports")
3
are genuine goods that are sold through unauthorized channels in direct
competition with authorized distributors.4 Most commonly, the goods are
i Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan.
I would like to acknowledge the able research assistance of Tengfei Wu, J.D. expected 2007,
University of Michigan.
2 As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, gray markets can arise in a variety of contexts.
The common feature in all, however, is that the allegedly infringing goods are manufactured
abroad, imported into the United States, and sold under the mark of a U.S. mark holder. See K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988) ("A gray-market good is a foreign-manu-
factured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent
of the United States trademark holder."). K Mart Corp. is discussed infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
3 The Third Circuit characterized the semantic difference between the two terms as
follows:
The term "gray-market goods" refers to foreign manufactured
goods, for which a valid United States trademark has been registered,
that are legally purchased abroad and imported into the United States
without the consent of the American trademark holder.
Appellants in the present case note that the term "gray-market" un-
fairly implies a nefarious undertaking by the importer, and that the more
accurate term for the goods at issue is "parallel import." We agree that
the term parallel import accurately describes the goods and is, perhaps,
a better term because it is devoid of prejudicial suggestion. For that
reason, we use that term in this discussion. However, we also employ the
term "gray-market" good because, for better or worse, it has become the
commonly accepted and employed reference to the goods at issue.
Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 E2d 659, 66z n.z (3d Cir. 1989).
4 According to the Federal Circuit, gray market goods are:
Goods [which] are produced and legitimately sold abroad under a par-
ticular trademark and are imported into the United States and sold in
competition with goods of the owner of U.S. trademark rights in the
identical mark. But for international boundaries and the territoriality of
trademark rights, the use of the trademark in competition with the U.S.
owner would not constitute infringement because of the relationship
between the foreign entity from whom the goods were directly or indi-
rectly obtained and the owner of U.S. rights in the mark. In this sense,
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produced or sold abroad under the authority or license of a U.S. mark hold-
er, and under a mark that is used both abroad and in the United States. The
goods are then imported into the United States without authorization from
the U.S. mark holder' and in violation of lawful arrangements made by the
mark holder to prohibit such importation and sales.6
"Gray market" goods differ from "black market" goods in that gray mar-
ket goods are not illegal and can be legitimately sold abroad. They are not
"counterfeit" goods because they have been manufactured and the mark
has been affixed to them (often by a foreign subsidiary or licensee) under
the authority of the U.S. owner of the mark.7 It is only their distribution in
the United States, not their existence or sale abroad, that makes gray mar-
ket goods potentially illegal.
Gray markets typically arise because of differentials between the prices
at which goods are sold overseas and the prices at which they are sold in the
grey market goods are "genuine" and bear a "genuine" trademark.
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Gamut Trading
Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2oo F 3 d 775, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The principle
of gray market law is that the importation of a product that was produced by the owner of the
United States trademark or with its consent, but not authorized for sale in the United States,
may, in appropriate cases, infringe the United States trademark.").
5 As described by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
Gray market goods are goods produced abroad under a trademark that
properly identifies the source of goods in the country of origin, but
which are subsequently marketed in this country without the consent
of the owner of the trademark in the United States. A gray market can
result from various marketing arrangements. A domestic company may
purchase exclusive United States distribution and trademark rights from
a foreign manufacturer, for example, or a foreign manufacturer may form
a domestic subsidiary to which it grants the exclusive right to market
goods under the trademark in this country. Similarly, a domestic trade-
mark owner may retain exclusive rights in the United States but license
the use of the mark to a foreign company for sales abroad. In these and
other situations, a gray market develops when a third person purchases
foreign-made goods bearing the trademark and imports them into the
United States for sale in competition with the United States trademark
owner.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. e (1995).
6 Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 Ed 633, 635 (Ist Cir.
1992); see also Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Nat'l Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., 890 E Supp. 152, 154
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Gray market goods are 'goods made by a foreign manufacturer, "legitimate-
ly sold abroad under a particular trademark[,] ... imported into the United States and sold in
competition with goods of the owner of [the United States] trademark rights in the identical
mark"'." (brackets in original) (citations omitted)).
7 Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 E2d 245, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Gray-market
goods are distinguished from counterfeit goods in that the use of the United States trademark
is authorized by the holder of the foreign trademark.").
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U.S. market.8 U.S. manufacturers often sell goods, particularly consumer
goods, in foreign markets at substantially lower prices. These lower prices
may reflect the fact that a foreign distributor, rather than the U.S. manufac-
turer, is incurring the foreign marketing and advertising costs; may reflect
differences in product characteristics or in availability of warranties or cus-
tomer service; or may be the result of a deliberate strategy on the part of the
U.S. manufacturer to expand its foreign sales. 9 Price differentials can also
occur as the result of currency fluctuations or taxation differences." The
price differential is often large enough that a distributor can then re-im-
port the goods to the United States at a price that undercuts the domestic
market."
Gray markets pose a number of competing policy concerns. Gray mar-
keters argue that their activities are legal because the goods they sell are
genuine and bear lawful marks. Thus, they contend that consumers are not
confused as to the source or origin of these goods.'" Consumer advocates
also argue in favor of gray markets, asserting that gray markets allow con-
sumers to purchase goods at a lower cost, thereby preventing price gouging
by manufacturers and promoting consumer welfare. 3
8 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Business and Legal Strategies for Combating Grey-Market
Imports, 32 INT'L LAW. 27, 28 (1998); Shubha Ghosh, An EconomicAnalysis of the Common Control
Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 373 (1994) ("[Wlhen goods
bearing identical trademarks are sold at different prices in two different geographic regions,"
incentives arise "for an arbitrageur to buy goods in the market with the lower price and resell
those goods in other markets at higher prices.").
9 See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F Supp. 1163, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
Steven M. Auvil, Gray Market Goods Produced by Foreign Affiliates of the U.S. Trademark Owner:
Should the Lanham Act Provide a Remedy?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 437, 438 (1995) (describing eco-
nomic explanations for gray markets).
o See Auvil, supra note 9, at 438.
II
[Tihere are many possible explanations why a grey market importer can
sell cheaper than the exclusive distributor. Although arbitrary price dis-
crimination is one possible explanation, there are many others ... includ-
ing particularly fluctuations in international currency markets, differing
cost conditions in other countries, and the fact . .. that the plaintiff-
markholder incurs many costs that the grey marketer does not. These
include, at a minimum, all the costs incurred for the maintenance and
enhancement of the mark's reputation, such as advertising and public
relations, consumer and dealer education, warranty service, and main-
tenance of inventory.
Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1176; see also Auvil, supra note 9, at 438.
12 See RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f (1995 ).
13 See Auvil, supra note 9, at 438-39; Friedman, supra note 8, at 28; Paul Lansing & Joseph
Gabriella, Clarifying Gray Market Gray Areas, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 313, 3i5 (1993); Christopher A.
Mohr, Comment, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law: An End Run Around K Mart v. Cartier,
45 CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 563 (1996).
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Manufacturers' groups, on the other hand, argue that gray markets harm
their goodwill and brand image. They complain that gray marketers are able
to reap the benefits of the manufacturers' expensive manufacturing and
advertising campaigns without incurring any of the accompanying costs. 4
Companies that hold exclusive rights to distribute and sell products in the
United States are also upset about facing unanticipated competition from
importers and sellers of gray market goods.15 In addition, if the gray market
goods differ materially from the goods produced for the domestic market
in quality, product characteristics, labeling, or other key elements, U.S. con-
sumers may be disappointed by the gray market goods, and the value of the
mark to the U.S. mark holder may be considerably diminished.
6
The issue of gray markets has become a pressing concern to manu-
facturers over the past decade, as changing world markets and economic
conditions have caused gray market activities to expand rapidly. Current
estimates on the size of gray markets are difficult to find and are industry-
specific, but they generally suggest a problem of staggering proportions. In
2003, for example, industry analysts estimated the global gray market for
information technology products alone to be $40 billion in sales, resulting
in an estimated $5 billion in lost profits annually.
7
No specific federal statutory provision addresses the problem of gray
market goods. Rather, plaintiffs have been forced to shoe-horn their gray
market complaints into existing provisions of either the Tariff Act of 1930
or the traditional trademark infringement provisions of the Lanham Act.'"
Because these statutory provisions were not written with the gray market
issue in mind, the courts have had to step in and create a substantial body
of jurisprudence to support and clarify these causes of action. Much of this
case law has arisen since the late 1980s, when gray market activities became
prevalent. Over the past two decades, the initially messy and somewhat
chaotic case law has evolved into a coherent pattern. Though hampered by
an inapposite and inadequate legislative scheme, the courts have done an
admirable job of creating a mechanism for addressing gray market goods
14 See Osawa & Co., 589 R Supp. at ii68 (noting that the plaintiff, a U.S. mark owner,
suffered harm as a result of gray market sellers free-riding on the plaintiff's advertising expen-
ditures and public relations efforts); seegenerally Auvil, supra note 9, at 438-39.
15 Osawa &Co., 589 F Supp. at Ii68 (gray market competition caused "demoralization,
disaffection, and misunderstanding among authorized dealers," who mistakenly believed the
U.S. mark owner was favoring the gray market sellers).
16 See Daniel A. DeVito & Benjamin Marks, Preventing Gray Marketing Imports after
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc., J. PROPRIETARY RTs.,
May 1998, at 2, 2; Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray Market Goods with Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L.
REv. 1187, 1189 (1994).
17 See Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit Abatement, FAQ, http://www.agmaglob-
al.org/resources/faq.shtml (last visited July 16, 2006).
I8 See infra notes 54-I 11 and accompanying text (describing the statutory bases for gray
market causes of action).
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that is consistent with the traditional twin trademark law goals of prevent-
ing consumer confusion and protecting mark holders' goodwill, without
straying too far beyond the confines of the existing legislative scheme.
This Article focuses primarily on gray market causes of action that arise
under the traditional trademark infringement provisions of the Lanham
Act. Part I provides a brief description of the evolution of gray market ju-
risprudence throughout the twentieth century. Part II describes the statu-
tory bases for gray market causes of action, which arise under Section 526
of the Tariff Act of 1930 and under Sections 32, 42, or 43 of the Lanham
Act. Gray market causes of action, depending upon the statutory provision
being used, may result in traditional trademark infringement remedies or
a barring of importation of the gray market goods. Part III analyzes the
"material differences" standard that the courts have developed for evaluat-
ing gray market claims under the Lanham Act. Part IV contains concluding
remarks.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF GRAY MARKET JURISPRUDENCE
The law regarding gray markets evolved considerably during the twentieth
century. Other scholars have provided in-depth analyses of the historical
foundations of gray maket jurisprudence,19 so I provide only a brief over-
view here. In general, courts tend to apply one of two competing theories to
gray market cases: (1) the older universality principle, under which a mark is
viewed as having no territorial limits and ownership is exhausted once the
mark is sold; and (2) the more modern territorialityprinciple, under which a
mark is viewed as being exclusively owned by the registrant or user within
each sovereign territory.20 The territoriality principle clearly dominates
contemporary gray market jurisprudence (as well as contemporary trade-
mark law in general)," l and it has important ramifications for the resolution
of gray market disputes.
Prior to 1923, the universality principle prevailed.2 As described by a
later court, under the universality principle, "goods lawfully made under a
trademark in one country, could be imported and sold in another country,
without infringing the rights of the domestic trademark owner. '23 The net
19 See generally TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW
(Paul L. Murphy ed., 1994); SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMic ASPECTS OF GRAY
MARKET GOODS (1990).
20 See Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 13, at 317-18; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f (1995).
21 See Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers, Inc., 406 E3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005)
("It is now generally agreed and understood that trademark protection encompasses the no-
tion of territoriality.").
22 For a general history of the universality principle, see HIEBERT, supra note i9, at 21-
42.
23 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Allen Distrib., Inc., 48 E Supp. 2d 844, 850 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (cit-
2oo6-2oo7]
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effect of the universality principle was to deny protection to U.S. trademark
holders from gray market goods. 4 For example, in the first gray market
case decided by a U.S. court, Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, the plaintiff was the
exclusive U.S. distributor of mineral water sold under the mark HUNYADI
JANOS. 5 The owner of the mark marketed the water in Europe. Although
the mark owner's bottles carried a statement cautioning against importation
into the United States, the defendant purchased the mark owner's bottled
water and imported it into the United States. When the defendant sold
the bottled water in competition with the exclusive U.S. distributor of the
water, the distributor sued, alleging trademark infringement.
2 6
The court rejected the claim, stating flatly that because "the defendant
is selling the genuine water ... the trade-mark is not infringed." 7 The
court also applied the exhaustion principle, 8 finding that the trademark
owner's right to control the branded goods ceased once the goods entered
the stream of commerce. 9 More importantly, however, the Apollinaris court
relied upon the universality principle in rejecting the trademark owner's
claim. The court opined that world trademark rights are indivisible and
that territorial trademark licenses (such as those purportedly granted to the
U.S. distributor by the mark owner) could not be created. The Apollinaris
court stated: "It was not possible by any contract... [for the mark owner] to
ing Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F 780, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1916), superseded by statute,
Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 975, as recognized in Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and abrogated by A. Bourgois & Co. v. Katzel, z6o U.S.
689 (1923); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. i8 (S.D.N.Y. I886), abrogated by A. Bourgois & Co.
v. Katzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923)); see also Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F Supp. 1163, 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[If a trademark was lawfully affixed to merchandise in one country, the
merchandise would carry that mark lawfully wherever it went and could not be deemed an
infringer although transported to another country where the exclusive right to the mark was
held by someone other than the owner of the merchandise.").
[The universality principle] stands for the proposition that a trademark
serves the sole purpose of identifying the source of a product. Under
this principle, a trademark is valid if it correctly identifies the origin or
source of the product, regardless of where the consumer purchases the
product. A gray market product does not violate trademark rights under
the universality principle as long as it bears a genuine trademark that
identifies the source of the product.
2 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.ioA (2004).
24 See 4 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
29:51 (4th ed. 2oo6) ("Early U.S. cases refused to protect U.S. trademark owners from parallel
imports of genuine goods obtained from the foreign manufacturer.").
25 Apollinaris, 27 F. at 19-20.
z6 Id.
27 Id. at 20.
28 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing the first sale doctrine and
exhaustion of rights).
29 Apollinaris, 27 F. at z.
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create a territorial title to the products of the spring; no such title is known
to the law of personal property."30
In effect, under the universality principle, trademarks were considered
solely an indication of the source of the good and did not establish goodwill
or other intangible benefits for the mark holder.31 Courts adhering to the
universality principle maintained that if a trademark was lawfully affixed
to goods in one country, those goods could be lawfully imported to another
country, even if another party in that second country held .the exclusive
right to the mark.3" The original manufacturer was considered to be the
source of the good identified by the trademark; thus, no confusion could
arise when genuine goods bearing the mark were imported into the United
States.33 As a consequence, a U.S. mark holder who had a contract for the
exclusive right to import foreign-marked goods had no remedy against a
third party who purchased genuine-marked goods abroad and imported
them into the United States.34
Moreover, under the universality principle, a U.S. manufacturer could
not bar third parties from re-importing goods bearing its mark and intend-
ed for sale in foreign markets. Rather, the courts maintained that the first
authorized sale of a validly trademarked product anywhere in the world
exhausted the trademark holder's exclusionary rights, i.e., once the mark
holder had released branded goods into the stream of commerce, the mark
holder lost the right to control the future distribution of those goods.3" Un-
der this principle, the U.S. mark holder had no right to bar the importation
and sale of authentically-marked foreign goods.36
30 Id.
31 Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 13, at 317; see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 301 (1988) (Under the universality approach, "trademarks do not confer on the own-
er property interests or monopoly power over intrabrand competition. Rather, they merely
protect the public from deception by indicating 'the origin of the goods they mark."') (citing
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F 539, 543 (2d. Cir. 1921), rev'd, 26o U.S. 689 (1923)).
32 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f(1995) ("Several early
decisions adopted a 'universality' principle of trademark rights under which goods lawfully
made under a trademark in one country could be imported and sold in another country with-
out infringing the rights of the domestic trademark owner."); 2 GILSON, supra note 23, § 5. I oA
("A gray market product does not violate trademark rights under the universality principle as
long as it bears a genuine trademark that identifies the source of the product.").
33 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f (I 99 5 ).
34 See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 29:51 ("Early U.S. cases refused to pro-
tect U.S. trademark owners from parallel imports of genuine goods obtained from the foreign
manufacturer.").
35 See, e.g., Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F 780, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1916) (no
trademark infringement occurs where a trademark is used to sell imported genuine goods
identified by the trademark), superseded by statute, Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42
Stat. 975, as recognized in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.zd 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and
abrogated by A. Bourgois & Co. v. Katzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923).
36 See Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2oo F3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
2oo6-2oo7]
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The universality principle reflected the infant stage of development
that the law of trademarks was in during the late 1800s. For example, the
Apollinaris court saw no role for trademarks "except to vouch for the genu-
ineness of the thing which it distinguishes from all counterfeits .... "'
Today, by contrast, trademarks are widely recognized as not only identify-
ing the source of goods but also as identifying and differentiating products,
indicating consistent quality, facilitating advertising and sales, and repre-
senting business goodwill. 8
As the law began to recognize the expanded functions that trademarks
serve, the universality principle began to wither,39 ultimately giving way to
the territoriality principle. 40 In A. Boudois &Co. v. Katzel,41 decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1923, the Court rejected the universality
principle, adopting instead the territoriality principle, under which a mark
is recognized as having a separate legal existence in each sovereign country
in which it is registered or otherwise legally recognized as a mark and re-
ceives the legal protection afforded by that country.4"
In Katzel, the defendant purchased genuine JAVA cosmetic powder in
France, imported it into the United States, and sold it under the JAVA mark
without the permission of the plaintiff, who purchased the U.S. business
and the U.S. trademark for JAVA.43 The Second Circuit followed precedent
("Until the Supreme Court's decision in [Katzel], the prevailing rule in the United States was
that the authorized sale of a validly trademarked product, anywhere in the world, exhausted
the trademark's exclusionary right; thus the holder of the corresponding registered United
States trademark was believed to have no right to bar the importation and sale of authentically
marked foreign goods."); see also infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing first
sale and exhaustion doctrines).
37 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 E I8, 20 (S.D.N.Y I886), abrogated by A. Bourgois & Co.
v. Katzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923).
38 See I MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 3:2 (4th ed. 1997).
39 See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Since
[KatzelJ, the universality principle has faded and been generally supplanted by the principle
of 'territoriality'...."); id. at 1172 (discussing how "[tlhe universality principle.., was flawed
in several related respects"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f(1995)
(universality principle has been rejected under U.S. law).
40 See generally 2 GILSON, supra note 23, § 5.iOA; HIEBERT, supra note 19, at 43-61 (de-
scribing evolution of the territoriality principle); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 29:51; Timothy
H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and Universality in Nineteenth
Century Trademark Law, 8o TRADEMARK REP. 483 (I990) (describing historical bases of univer-
sality and territoriality principles).
41 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923).
42 See 2 GILSON, supra note 23, § 5.ioA.
43 Katzel, 26o U.S. at 69o-9i; see also A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F 539, 539-40 (2d
Cir. 192 1) (providing additional description of case facts), rev'd, 26o U.S. 689 (1923), andsuper-
sededby statute, Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 975, as recognized in Vivitar Corp.
v. United States, 761 E2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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based on universality principles and held there was no trademark infringe-
ment.
44
The Supreme Court reversed.4 5 Justice Holmes, writing for a unani-
mous Court, stated that the true significance of the trademark is to signify
the local business goodwill of the U.S. owner of the mark, not to signify
the origin or manufacture of the goods.4 The Court also established that
trademarks are inherently limited in territorial scope:
Ownership of the goods does not carry the right.., to sell them at all in
a given place.... It is said that the trade-mark here is that of the French
house and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It
is the trade-mark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in
law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the
plaintiff although not made by it. It was sold and could only be sold with the
good will of the business that the plaintiff bought. It stakes the reputation
of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.
47
Thus, under the territoriality principle, the trademark is viewed as not
necessarily identifying to consumers in a particular country the original
manufacturer of the goods, but rather as identifying the company that owns
the exclusive trademark rights within that country. As explained by one
court, the territoriality principle:
[Riecognizes that a trademark has a separate legal existence under each
country's laws, and that its proper lawful function is not necessarily to speci-
fy the origin or manufacture of a good (although it may incidentally do that),
but rather to symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder
so that the consuming public may rely with an expectation of consistency
on the domestic reputation earned for the mark by its owner, and the owner
of the mark may be confident that his goodwill and reputation (the value of
the mark) will not be injured through use of the mark by others in domestic
commerce.
48
Although the territoriality principle dominates modern U.S. trademark
law, 49 Katzel and its articulation of the territoriality principle have not been
44 A. Bourois &Co., 275 F. at 540 ("The question is whether the defendant has not the
right to sell this article under the trade-marks which truly indicate its origin. We think she
has.").
45 Katzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923).
46 Id. at 692. While Katzel was on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress enact-
ed section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, with the apparent intent of overruling the Second
Circuit's decision. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. The KatzelCourt did not reference
this new legislation in its decision.
47 Katzel, z6o U.S. at 692 (citation omitted).
48 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
49 The territoriality approach is also adopted by the Paris Convention for the Protection
2oo6-2oo7]
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universally embraced. Some courts sought to limit Katzel to its facts,5" and
the territoriality principle itself has been characterized by one leading trea-
tise "as obsolete in a world market where information products like com-
puter programs cannot be located at a particular spot on the globe."'
Although the issue of gray markets received little judicial attention in
the decades following Katzel,52 changing international market conditions
in the 1980s magnified the prominence of the issue and resulted in an
increased number of gray market cases.5 3 As the plaintiffs in these cases
quickly discovered, however, Congress had not enacted a statutory provi-
sion specifically addressing gray market claims. Trademark owners upset
by the gray market sales of their products were (and still are) forced to
shoe-horn their claims into the statutory provisions of either the Tariff Act
of 1930 or the Lanham Act. As discussed below, both statutes provide, at
best, an uneasy fit for such claims.
II. STATUTORY BASES FOR GRAY MARKET CAUSES OF ACTION
Plaintiffs may base their gray market complaints on either Section 526 of
the Tariff Act of 19 3 0 14 or various sections of the Trademark Act of 1946,
commonly known as the Lanham Act.55 Most plaintiffs employ multiple
of Industrial Property art. 6,July 14, 1967,21 U.S.T. 1583 ("A mark duly registered in a country
of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of
the Union, including the country of origin.").
50 See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We do
not read Katzel to extend beyond [its] circumstance."); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792
F.2d 315, 321-22 (zd Cir. 1986) (restricting the reach of Katzel because "the Supreme Court
[has] suggested that Katzel [has] limited application to any but its own special facts"); see also
RESTATEMENT ('MHIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f(1995) ("The scope and meaning
of the territoriality principle announced in Katzel remain unclear. The broadest interpretation
recognizes independent trademark rights in the domestic owner by operation of law, and any
importation and sale of gray market goods without the domestic owner's consent would thus
be an infringement. This view gives primacy to the domestic law of registration and owner-
ship without regard to the actual significance of the trademark in the marketplace. Some
cases, limiting the Katzel decision more closely to its facts, have held instead that when the
domestic trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer are affiliated, gray market sales do
not infringe.").
51 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 29:1.
52 See Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. IO63, IO65 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) ("legal journals [were] the main battleground" for gray market issues post-Katze), va-
cated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
53 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 29:46 ("[Clhanging world economic conditions led to
a torrent of court decisions concerning parallel imports in the late 198os.").
54 SeeTariffAct of 1930 § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (zooo).
55 Lanham Act ch. 540, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000): see 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (pro-
viding remedies for infringement of a registered mark). Gray market goods may also be chal-
lenged under either state or federal dilution statutes. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Custom Sch.
Frames, LLC, 259 E Supp. 2d 503, 509 (E.D. La. 2003) (arising under federal and Louisiana
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theories of liability. While the Tariff Act and Section 42 of the Lanham Act
bar importation of gray market goods, 56 Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham
Act provide remedies for infringement by gray market goods.17 Unfortu-
nately, because gray market activities do not fit neatly within either statu-
tory regime, courts were forced to fill in the interstices of the law in this
area with substantial case law, which led to the creation and evolution of
the material differences test.
A. Barring Importation of Gray Market Goods: Section 526
of the Tariff Act and Section 42 of the Lanham Act
A U.S. trademark owner who is alert and able to identify potential gray mar-
ket goods before they enter the country may solicit the assistance of the
U.S. Customs Service in barring the importation of the goods under Sec-
tion 526 of the Tariff Act and/or Section 42 of the Lanham Act.58 While the
material differences standard arises in Section 42 cases, 9 it does not apply
to Section 526 cases. Nonetheless, because Section 526 and Section 42 are
dilution statutes); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1532, 1533 (N.D. I11. Mar. 21, zoo) (arising under federal dilution statute), aff'dsub
nom. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 E3 d 690 (7th Cir. 2006); Grupo
Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria El Molino Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1534 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
1996) (arising under Lanham Act and California dilution statute).
In addition, Section 337 of the Tariff Act, i9 U.S.C. § 1337, also prohibits importation of
articles that infringe a registered trademark and protects against infringement of unregistered
marks. The International Trade Commission (ITC) may file suit for a Section 337 violation,
and can issue exclusion orders against the importation of gray-market goods and cease-and-
desist orders barring the sale of already-imported gray market goods. See generally Margo A.
Bagley, Comment, Using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193o to Block Materially Different Gray
Market Goods in the Common Control Context: Are Reports of Its Death Greatly Exaggerated?, 44
EMORY L.J. 1541, 1558 (1995); Bryan A. Schwartz, Remedy and Bonding Law Under Section 337:
A Primerforthe Patent Litigator, 81 J. PAT. & TRMDEMARK OFF. Soc'y 623,623 (1999) Section 337
is used primarily in patent infringement cases, see id. at 1554, but has been used in some gray
market cases as well. See, e.g., Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 E3d 1317, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2oo6); SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F3d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2968 (2oo6); Gamut Trading Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
200 E3d 775, 776-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Section 337 proceedings can be in rem against the
product itself-an advantage if the identity of all infringers is not known at the time of the
proceeding. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (zooo). The ITC can issue temporary or permanent exclusion
orders that bar importation of goods. i9 U.S.C. § 1337(d)-(e) (zooo). The material differences
test can apply in Section 337 cases. See generally Vivek Koppikar, Evaluating the International
Trade Commission's Section 33 7 Investigation, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC' 432 (2004).
56 See infra notes 58-88 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 89-1 11 and accompanying text.
58 See Tariff Act of 1930 § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2ooo); Lanham Act § 42, 15 U.S.C. §
1124 (2000).
59 See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
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often used in tandem, Section 526 is a crucial part of the mosaic of statutory
provisions governing gray market cases and so is discussed briefly here.
A mark owner may simultaneously pursue Section 526 benefits and
Lanham Act remedies. While Section 526 of the Tariff Act requires the U.S.
mark holder to be a U.S. domiciliary, Section 42 of the Lanham Act does
not. Normally, a plaintiff who owns a U.S. registration and who is domiciled
in the United States will seek relief under both Section 526 and Section
42.
1. Section 526 of the TariffAct.-Section 5261 of the Tariff Act of 1930 pro-
hibits importation of goods bearing a registered mark owned by a U.S. citi-
zen or corporation without the consent of that trademark owner.61 Under
U.S. Customs Service regulations, prohibited marks include those that are
actual identical counterfeits of the original mark as well as those so similar




60 Section 526(a) provides, in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful
to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufac-
ture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corpora-
tion or association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled
in the United States .... and if a copy of the certificate of registration
of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, ... unless
written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time
of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § I526(a) (2000). Section 526 was initially enacted as section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1922, and subsequently reenacted as section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See also Coty, Inc.
v. Le Blume Imp. Co., 292 F. 264, 269 (S.D.N.Y.) ("Had the Supreme Court reversed [Katzel
earlier], it would not have been enacted at all."), aff'd, 293 F 344 (2d Cir. 1923); LIPNER, supra
note 19, at 99-128 (providing history of Section 526). An excellent summary of the legislative
and regulatory history of Section 526 is found in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F Supp. 420,
425-28 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 Ed 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also Osawa & Co. v. B
& H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing history of Section 526);
HIEBERT, supra note 19, at 66-84 (discussing history of Section 526).
61 Proof of likelihood of confusion is not required under Section 526. To invoke the aid
of the Customs Service in excluding the importation of gray market goods, the trademark
owner must record its mark with Customs. See i9 C.F.R. § 133.1 (2005) (describing trademarks
eligible to be recorded with Customs).
62 9 C.ER. § 133.2 i(a) (2005). The Customs Service must evaluate the mark from the
perspective of an "average purchaser," not an "expert." See Montres Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718
E2d 524, 531-32 (2d Cir. 1983) (adopting the "average purchaser" test and explaining that
Customs should compare the challenged mark to that actually used by the registrant, not to
the exact form of the mark shown on the registration record, because "[t]o allow such differ-




Section 526 was originally enacted by Congress in 1922, at least partly
in response to its rejection of the Second Circuit's holding in A. Boujois
& Co. v. Katzel that if the allegedly infringing goods were the same as the
genuine goods sold under a true mark, the trademark owner's rights were
not infringed. 63 As discussed earlier,64 the Supreme Court subsequently re-
versed the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel, making no mention of the
newly-enacted Section 526, but instead emphasizing the territoriality of
trademark rights.
65
In the first fifty years following the enactment of Section 526, the Cus-
toms Service adopted a series of implementing regulations with varying in-
terpretations of the underlying statute.' In 1972, Customs again amended
63 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, z6o U.S. 689 (1923),
and superseded by statute, Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 975, as recognized in
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 Fzd 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussed supra notes 41-47 and
accompanying text). As explained by the Federal Circuit:
The Second Circuit decision in Katzel had greater significance at
the time than may be readily apparent. During World War I, the Alien
Property Custodian (an arm of the federal government) had seized as-
sets in this country owned by foreign nationals of enemy countries and
had sold them to U.S. interests. Thus, a number of substantial U.S. busi-
nesses had been created, e.g., the U.S. maker of BAYER aspirin, which
was entirely independent of its German counterpart and which would
have been adversely affected by importation of "genuine" goods from
abroad with the normalization of international relations. Thus, the Katzel
litigation was pursued to the U.S. Supreme Court, which accepted the
case, and efforts were also directed to Congress to provide relief from
the Second Circuit's decision.
Vivitar, 761 E2d at 1562. According to the legislative history:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals [Katzi] holds that exist-
ing law does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the
same trade-mark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported
merchandise is genuine and if there is no fraud upon the public. The
Senate amendment makes such importation unlawful without the con-
sent of the owner of the American trade-mark.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 67-1223, at 158 (1922)).
64 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65 See Kazzel, 26o U.S. 689 (1923) (discussed supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text).
66 Initially, the Customs Service adopted regulations that simply recognized that U.S.
owners of registered marks are entitled to the protection of Section 526. By 1936, however,
Customs had enacted regulations that prohibited imports of foreign goods bearing genuine
marks unless the U.S. mark owner consented; the prohibition did not apply where the same
entity owned both the foreign and domestic marks. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 E Supp.
420, 429 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A 1953 revision of the
regulations allowed importation of such goods even in the absence of the mark owner's con-
sent if the foreign mark was owned by a company related to the U.S. mark owner. Vivitar, 761
Fzd at 1552, 1566. In 1959, Customs returned to the 1936 exception. See id. at 1567 (noting,
for example, that "importation was allowed without consent only if the 'same entity' owned
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its regulations, this time to permit importation under Section 526 where:
(1) the foreign and domestic marks were owned by the same person or
entity; (2) the foreign producer and the domestic mark owner were under
common control (such as in a parent-subsidiary relationship); or (3) the do-
mestic mark owner had authorized the use of the mark, though not the im-
portation of the goods. 67 The first two exceptions were known, respectively,
as the "common ownership" and "common control" exceptions; the third
was known as the "authorized use" exception.
These three exceptions to the regulations were highly controversial,
and a number of U.S. trademark owners challenged the legality of Customs'
regulations. The end result was inconsistent decisions by various circuit
courts of appeals. 68 In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the conflict
regarding the legality of Customs' regulations in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc.69 The suit was brought by an association of U.S. mark holders who
rights here and abroad").
67 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 289 n.Z (1988) (quoting 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(C) (1987), which the case partially invalidated). K Mart is further discussed infra notes
69-73 and accompanying text. See also Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561-68 (setting forth history of
Customs regulations on Section 526).
68 See Vivitar, 761 F2d at 1570 (holding that the regulations were "valid but not control-
ling with respect to the scope of protection" afforded to a U.S. trademark owner and that a
U.S. owner may file suit to enjoin the sale of parallel imports as a violation of Section 526 even
where the regulations would not bar importation); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d
315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the regulation and noting that mark owners have the right
under Section 526(c) to pursue private remedies against importers even if Customs declines
to exclude the goods). Compare Coal. to Pres. the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States,
790 E2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the regulations were inconsistent with legisla-
tive intent and the statute, and that a U.S. trademark owner may bar importation of products
bearing an identical mark regardless of the U.S. company's relationship to the foreign manu-
facturer), aff'dsub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, andaff'din part, rev'd in part,
486 U.S. 281 (1988), with Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F2d 850,
858-60 (3d Cir. 1986) (trademarks have a territorial foundation and gray market goods that
infringe on the domestic goodwill of the U.S. trademark owner may be enjoined).
69 Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281.
The Court outlined three basic gray market scenarios in an effort to describe the gray
market problem:
Case I: A domestic firm purchases the rights to register and use an in-
dependent foreign firm's trademark as a U.S. trademark and to sell its
foreign-manufactured goods in the United States. If the foreign manu-
facturer or a third party imports the goods into the United States, they
would be gray market goods competing with the domestic firm's goods.
See id. at 286 (defining this as the "prototypical" gray market case, based
on Katzl).
Case 2: The domestic firm registers the U.S. trademark "for goods that
are manufactured abroad by an affiliated manufacturer." In variation
2(a), a foreign firm incorporates a U.S. subsidiary, which then registers
a U.S. trademark identical to the parent's foreign trademark in its own
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sought an injunction against the enforcement of Customs' regulations on
the grounds that they were not a reasonable administrative interpretation
of Section 526.70
A sharply divided Court held, in a plurality opinion, that the common-
ownership and common-control exceptions of Customs' regulations were
reasonable administrative interpretations of Section 526,"' but the autho-
rized-use exception was not.7" The net result is that Section 526 of the Tar-
iff Act bars importation of foreign-made goods where the U.S. trademark
owner is a U.S. entity and is unaffiliated with the foreign manufacturer of
the goods; no showing of a likelihood of customer confusion is necessary.73
The prohibitions of Section 526 do not apply, however, when both the for-
eign and domestic owners are subject to common control.74
2. Section 42 of the Lanham Act.-Section 42 of the Lanham Act also bars
the importation of gray market goods, although it addresses goods having
name. Variation 2(b) occurs when an American-based firm establishes a
manufacturing subsidiary corporation abroad; variation 2(c) occurs when
an American-based firm establishes its own unincorporated manufactur-
ing division abroad. In both instances, the foreign facility is used to pro-
duce U.S. trademarked goods for importation for domestic distribution.
If the trademarked goods are sold abroad, the parallel importation of
these goods creates a gray market. See id. at 286-87.
Case 3: The domestic holder ofa U.S. trademark "authorizes an indepen-
dent foreign manufacturer to use" the mark; if the goods are imported
into the U.S. market without the domestic trademark's holder's authori-
zation, a gray market exists. Id. at 287.
The K Mart Court addressed only the validity of Customs' regulations with respect to
Section 526 of the TariffAct; the Court did not interpret the TariffAct itself, nor did it address
the scope of private causes of action under Section 526 or trademark owners' remedies under
the Lanham Act. Id. at 29o n.3.
70 Id. at 290.
71 Id. at 294. Thus, the Court held that i9 C.ER. § 133.21(c)(I) and (2) were valid.
72 Id. at 294. The authorized-use exception was found at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3); see
supra note 67.
73 Not surprisingly, the KMart decision engendered a substantial amount of law review
commentary. See, e.g., William H. Allen, The Supreme Court's Gray-Market Decision, 70 J. PAT. &
'TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 688 (1988); Auvil, supra note 9; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment,
Applying Grecian Formula to International Trade: K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. and the Legality
of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REV. 1397 (1989); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of
the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1994);
Donna M. Lach, Note, The Gray Market and the Customs Regulation-Is the Controversy Really
Overafter K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.?, 65 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 221 (989); J. Thomas Warlick
IV, Comment, Of Blue Light Specials and Gray-Market Goods: The Perpetuation of the Parallel
Importation Controversy, 39 EMORY L.J. 347 (1990).
74 See United States v. Eighty-Three Rolex Watches, 992 E2d 508,512-14 (5th Cir. 1993)
(parallel importation not prohibited where domestic and foreign owners of the mark are sub-
ject to common ownership and control).
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a mark that "copies or simulates" a registered mark.75 Unlike Section 526
of the Tariff Act, Section 42 of the Lanham Act protects foreign, as well as
domestic, entities owning U.S. registered marks.
Section 42 only prevents the importation of "non-genuine" goods.
76
This qualification is important because goods are generally regarded by the
courts as non-genuine if they are "materially different" from the trademark
owner's goods authorized for sale in the United States." This issue was
addressed in 1993 in Lever Brothers Co. v. United States.78 Both Lever Broth-
ers Co., a U.S. company, and its British affiliate, Lever Brothers Limited,
manufactured SHIELD deodorant soap and SUNLIGHT dishwashing
liquid. The products were formulated differently to satisfy the consumer
preferences and circumstances of the two different local markets, and the
products were packaged differently.79
Lever Brothers Co. argued that the importation of the British goods by
a third party violated Section 42 of the Lanham Act. The Customs Service,
however, allowed importation of the goods under the "affiliate exception"
to its regulations, which permitted importation of foreign goods bearing
U.S. trademarks when "[t]he foreign and domestic trademark or tradename
owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to
common ownership or control." 80 Customs argued that Section 42 applied
only to imports of goods bearing marks that "copy or simulate" registered
marks, not to "genuine" marks, and asserted that a mark applied by a for-
75 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2ooo). This section provides in relevant part: "IN]o article of im-
ported merchandise ... which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter ... shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the
United States...."
76 See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659,672 (3d Cir. 1989) (Section
42 has "two broad policy goals... : (i) protection against consumer deception... [and] (2) pro-
tection of the trademark holder's investment in goodwill .... [N]either of the goals is under-
mined by the importation of genuine goods."); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315,
321 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The plain language of the statute does not bar importation if the goods are
genuine, only if they 'copy or simulate' a trademark."). The D.C. Circuit distinguished these
cases on the grounds that the goods at issue were genuine because they were not physically or
materially different from the authorized goods. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F2d o1,
io9 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Lever Bros. 19891; see also IPB, Inc. v. Hady Enters., Inc., 267
F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1165 n.29 (N.D. Fla. 2002) ("Generally, trademark law.., does not apply to
the resale of genuine, trademarked goods by someone other than the trademark owner.").
77 See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cit. 1993)
("Trademarks applied to physically different foreign goods are not genuine from the view-
point of the American consumer.") [hereinafter LeverBros. 1993]; Societe Des Produits Nestle,
S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.zd 633, 639 (Ist Cit. 1992) ("[Tlhe importation of a gray good
identical to a good authorized for sale in the domestic market does not violate section 42."
However, "the existence of physical differences changes the result.") (citations omitted).
78 LeverBros. 1993,981 F.zd at 1333.
79 Id. at 1331.
8o Id. at 1331-32 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 133.2I(c)(2) (1987)) (brackets in original).
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eign firm subject to common ownership or control with the domestic trade-
mark owner is, by definition, "genuine."'
'
The District Court rejected Lever Brothers Co.'s motion for an injunc-
tion,8" and the company appealed. The D.C. Circuit tentatively held, pend-
ing further consideration on remand, that where the authorized U.S. goods
are physically and materially different from the foreign goods, Section 42
of the Lanham Act prohibits importation of goods bearing a mark that cop-
ies or simulates a U.S. mark, regardless of whether the mark is genuine
or whether there is an affiliation between the two firms involved. s3 After
remand, the D.C. Circuit reiterated that an affiliation of the type present
did not reduce the probability of consumer confusion' and that to the
American consumer, marks applied to physically different foreign goods
are not "genuine." s Thus, the Lever Bros. court held that Section 42 does
not permit application of Customs' "affiliate exception" where the U.S.-
authorized and foreign goods are physically and materially different. 6
In response to the Lever decision, the Customs Service amended its
regulations in 1999 to create a caveat to its "affiliate exception" to the
prohibition of gray market imports. The caveat to the affiliate exception,
which is known as "the Lever Rule,"8" bars the importation of goods bearing
a genuine trademark or trade name where the goods are physically and ma-
terially different from the goods authorized by the U.S. trademark owner
for importation or sale in the United States, unless the goods bear a "con-
spicuous and legible label" noting the existence of the physical material
differences.88 The Lever Rule continues to control in this area today.
81 Id. at 1337-38.
82 Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 403, 407 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 877 E2d
o i (D.C. Cir. 1989).
83 LeverBros. 1989, 877 F2d at i i i ("[T]he natural, virtually inevitable reading of § 42
is that it bars foreign goods bearing a trademark identical to a valid US trademark but physi-
cally different, regardless of the trademarks' genuine character abroad or affiliation between
the producing firms.").
84 Lever Bros. 1993, 981 F2d at 1338 ("The fact of affiliation between the producers in
no way reduces the probability of [consumer] confusion....") (quoting Lever Bros. 1989, 877
Ezd at iii).
85 See supra quotation of L.ever Bros. at note 77. While Lever Bros. was analyzed under
Section 42 of the Lanham Act, its analysis of customer confusion applies as well to infringe-
ment claims brought under Sections 32 or 43(a). See, e.g., Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading,
Inc., 753 E Supp. 1240, 1246 n.io (D.N.J.), (noting that although Lever Bros. was decided un-
der Section 42, its "reasoning and logic employed are germane" to cases arising under Section
43 as well: "The analysis employed in assessing the impact of such action is no less valid
and illuminating, merely because a differing statutory provision is in question."), aff'd, 935
F2d iz81 (3d Cir.), andf rv'd, 952 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing only the award of attorney
fees).
86 LeverBros. 1993,981 E2d at 1338.
87 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(a)(3) (zoo5).
88 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b) (2005). The label must state: "This product is not a product
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B. Suing for Trademark Infringement: Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act governs the federal registration and use of marks and pro-
vides causes of action for infringement of such marks. Marks are the words
or symbols used by companies or individuals to distinguish or identify their
goods or services.89 They serve the important functions of identifying and
differentiating products or services, indicating consistent source and quali-
ty, and facilitating advertising and sales. 9° As discussed earlier,9" trademarks
are "territorial"; i.e., they extend only to the boundaries of the sovereign
that registers or recognizes the mark. Moreover, because manufacturers of-
ten tailor products to different markets, a trademark's reputation and good-
will may well vary from nation to nation.9
Two general principles underlie the Lanham Act. First, the Act seeks
to protect consumers from confusion. In the words of the Supreme Court,
trademark protection is intended to ensure that the consuming public "will
get the product which it asks for and wants to get."9 3 Second, the Act seeks
to protect the mark owner's goodwill and the owner's "ability to shape the
contours of his reputation." 94
The traditional cause of action under the Lanham Act is for infringe-
ment. Infringement typically occurs when the defendant uses a mark that
is identical or substantially similar to the existing mark of the plaintiff on
competing goods, such that prospective purchasers are likely to be con-
fused, mistaken, or deceived as to the identity or source of the goods in-
volved. 95 The hallmark of a trademark infringement claim, therefore, is the
authorized by the United States trademark owner for importation and is physically and mate-
rially different from the authorized product." Id. The label is intended to inform the consumer
of the differences between the gray market and authorized goods and is supposed to remain
on the good until its first sale to a retail customer in the United States.
89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2ooo) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof.., used ... to identify and distinguish [the owner's]
goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.").
90 See i MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 3:2.
91 See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text (discussing territoriality principle).
92 See Societe Des Produ its Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 E 2d 633, 636 (1st Cir.
1992) ("Because products are often tailored to specific national conditions, a trademark's repu-
tation (and, hence, its goodwill) often differs from nation to nation.") (citation omitted).
93 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,782 n. 15 (1992) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, at 3 (1946)).
94 Nestle, 982 F.2d at 636; see also S. REP. No. 1333, at 3 ("[Wlhere the owner of a trade-
mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is pro-
tected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.").
95 See Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 E3 d 474, 477-78 (2d Cir. 1996) (ques-
tion is "whether 'numerous ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or confused
as to the source of the product in question because of the entrance in the marketplace of
defendant's mark') (quoting Gruner + Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072,
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existence of customer confusion.' This same standard applies to gray mar-
ket actions brought under Sections 32 and 43: do U.S. consumers identify
the foreign manufacturer as the source of the allegedly gray market goods
(in which case there is no infringement), or do they identify the U.S. trade-
mark owner as the source (in which case there is infringement)?97 In deter-
mining whether consumer confusion is likely, courts look to the standard of
an average hypothetical consumer-one who, in the eyes of many courts,
is not regarded as overly discerning. In the words of the Second Circuit,
"[tihe law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public-that
vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credu-
lous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed
by appearances and general impressions."98 Thus, the consumer confusion
test sets a fairly low bar for infringement plaintiffs.
In addition to protecting consumers from deceit and confusion, trade-
mark law protects the goodwill of the trademark holder.9 This protection
1077 (2d Cir. 1993)); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F3d 497, 502 (ad Cir.
1996) (question is whether the defendant's use of the mark and image creates a "likelihood
that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed
simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question"') (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc.
v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F2d 44,47 (2d Cir. 1978)).
96 For a discussion of the factors that courts use to evaluate whether likelihood of con-
sumer confusion exists, see AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 E2d 341,348- 5 4 (9th Cir. 1979).
See generally 2 GILSON, supra note 23, § 5.01.
97 See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. ad 844, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1999)
("The key inquiry under sections 32( I)(a) or 43(a) of the Lanham Act is whether Defendants'
activities are likely to cause consumer confusion."). As stated in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition:
The "source" indicated by a trademark may instead be the company
perceived by consumers as assuring the consistent quality of the goods.
In gray market contexts, a factual question thus exists as to whether
the trademark identifies the domestic trademark owner or the foreign
manufacturer. To the extent that the trademark identifies to prospective
purchasers the domestic owner as distinguished from the foreign manu-
facturer, imported gray market goods are not goods the source of which
is accurately identified by the trademark .... The sale of such goods
under the trademark is therefore an infringement.
RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. f (1995).
98 Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (d Cir. 191o) (cited by Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 64o E Supp. 928,932 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd,
816 F2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987)).
99 The Supreme Court stated that:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psy-
chological function of symbols .... A trade-mark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what
he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this
human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere
of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever
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extends beyond the sale of inferior goods by another party. As the First Cir-
cuit stated: "[e]ven if an infringer creates a product that rivals or exceeds
the quality of the registrant's product, the wrongful sale of the unauthorized
product may still deprive the registrant of his ability to shape the contours
of his reputation."100 The Lanham Act thus protects a mark holder from the
sale of goods that are different from those legitimately sold under the mark,
even if those other goods are of the same or even higher quality11
Two sections of the Lanham Act offer relief to plaintiffs seeking to sue
for trademark infringement as a result of gray market activities: Section 32
and Section 43. Both of these sections have been interpreted as applying
to gray market situations.10 A similar analysis typically applies under both
sections,103 requiring a finding that "the defendant's goods are likely to be
thought to have originated with, or to have been sponsored by, the true
owner of the mark." 104
1. Section 32 of the Lanham Act.-Section 32 is available to both domestic
and foreign entities who own U.S. registered marks. It provides the owner
of a U.S. registered trademark with a cause of action against anyone who,
without the owner's consent, uses a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-
orable imitation of a registered mark" in such a way as to create a likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception. 05 To be successful, a claim brought
the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism
of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
ioo Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.zd 633, 636 (Ist Cit.
1992).
1i See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 E2d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 1976)
(Lanham Act violation existed even though plaintiff's and defendant's goods were of "equal
quality").
soz See Philip Morris, Inc., 48 F Supp. 2d at 849.
103 SeeNestle, 982 F.2d at 640 ("Whether the fulcrum of plaintiffs' complaint is perceived
as section 32(l)(a), section 42, or section 43(a), liability necessarily turns on the existence vel
non of material differences between the products of a sort likely to create consumer con-
fusion."); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F Supp. 1240, 1246 n.lo (D.N.J.)
("[Tihe reasoning and logic employed [in a § 42 claim] are germane to a § 43 violation."),
aff'd, 935 E2d 1281 (3d Cir.), andrev'd, 952 F.zd 44 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing only the award
of attorney fees).
1o4 Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's
Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962).
105 Section 32(i)(a) provides in pertinent part:
(i) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imit-
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under Section 32 requires "a showing of the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion as to source of origin." 106
Gray market goods by definition bear authentic trademarks (it is only
their distribution that is arguably illegal). Moreover, genuine goods do not
lead to customer confusion, and accordingly, their sale is not barred by trade-
mark law.17 To obtain a remedy under Section 32, therefore, the aggrieved
trademark owner must show that the gray market products involved are not
"genuine." As discussed below, this generally requires a finding of "'mate-
rial differences' between the products sold by the trademark owner and
those sold by the alleged infringer."1"8
2. Section 43 of the Lanham Act.-Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits
the marketing of goods bearing a "false designation of origin," a false de-
tion of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant ....
15 U.S.C. § II 14(1)(a) (zooo). This cause of action is not limited to gray market goods but
can also be used to challenge the sale of domestic goods in circumstances materially different
from those specified by the trademark owner. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev.
Corp., 86 E3d 3 (zd Cir. 1996) (trademark owner entitled to injunction against sale of trade-
marked cough drops past their expiration date); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug
Mart, Inc., 988 E2d 587 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no material difference where the identical
domestic products were sold through authorized and unauthorized channels); Shell Oil Co.
v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 Ezd 104 (4th Cir. i991) (finding material difference and
enjoining wholesaler where it sold trademarked Shell oil but did not conform to stringent
quality control standards imposed by Shell on its licensees); see also Iberia Foods Corp. v.
Romeo, 15o F3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (Infringement by materially different goods "is not
limited to gray goods cases .... The same theory has been used to enjoin the sale of domestic
products in conditions materially different from those offered by the trademark owner."). The
Fifth Circuit noted that domestic material differences cases raise different issues than parallel
import cases because the territorial scope of the trademark is not at issue in a domestic case:
"[Tirademark protection can extend to an owner's efforts to maintain the value and goodwill
of the trademark in a particular territory, where the owner has endeavored to confine the use
of the trademark to certain goods." Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading
USA, Co., 112 F3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1997).
io6 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir.
1987) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
107 See NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 8 1o Fzd 15o6, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Trademark
law generally does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though such
sale is without the mark owner's consent .... The reason is that trademark law is designed to
prevent sellers from confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a product,
which confusion ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold."
(citations omitted)); Novartis Animal Health US, Inc. v. LM Connelly & Sons, Pty. Ltd., No.
04 Civ. 10213 (BSJ) (RLE), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15214, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2005); NEC
Electronics, 81o F2d at 1509 (trademark law does not generally prohibit the sale of genuine
goods because such goods do not lead to customer confusion).
io8 tberia Foods, 15o E3d at 302-03.
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scription, or a false representation." 9 "Origin" here refers not only to geo-
graphic origin but also to "origin of source, sponsorship, or affiliation.""'
Unlike Section 32, Section 43(a) applies to both registered and unregis-
tered marks. The "key question" in determining gray market liability un-
der Section 43(a) is nonetheless similar to that employed under Section 32:
"[Wihether material differences likely to confuse consumers exist between
[authorized and unauthorized goods] bearing the same mark.""'
III. THE "MATERIAL DIFFERENCES" STANDARD
The existing statutory scheme was not drafted with the thought of gray
market causes of action in mind, and it has taken some effort for gray mar-
I09 Section 43(a) provides in pertinent part:
(I) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1i25(a)(1) (zooo).
110 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 27:14.
I I I Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F2d 633, 640 (Ist Cit.
1992).
In addition, under Section 43(b), Customs may prohibit importation of goods that violate
Section 43(a). See i9 C.F.R. § 11.13(a) (2005) ("Articles which bear, or the containers which
bear, false designations of origin, or false descriptions or representations, including words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the articles, are prohibited importation
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 294-96, 1124, 1125 or 48 U.S.C. § 14o5q, and shall be detained."); see also
United States v. Nippon Miniature Bearing Corp., 155 F Supp. 2d 707, 708 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2001) ("Customs may deny entry to merchandise that violates Section 43(a)."). Customs need
not obtain a judicial ruling before undertaking such an action but rather may make its own
determination that such a violation has occurred. Id. at 708. Section 43(b) provides:
Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of
this section shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to
entry at any customhouse of the United States. The owner, importer,
or consignee of the goods refused entry at any customhouse under this
section may have any recourse by protest or appeal that is given under
the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given by this chapter
in cases involving goods refused entry or seized.
iS U.S.C. § 11 25(b) (2000).
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ket complainants to fit their claims into this framework. The traditional
Lanham Act consumer-confusion test is difficult to apply in gray market
cases because gray market goods are generally considered to be genuine."'
The courts have responded to their efforts by creating the material dif-
ferences standard. This standard has now evolved into the predominant
test for evaluating gray market claims under the Lanham Act, regardless of
whether those claims arise under Section 32, 42, or 43.113
Under traditional trademark infringement law, when the same mark is
used on two blatantly different products, such as use of the mark MAY-
FLOWER for a moving company and for a sailboat company,"4 no Lanham
Act violation has occurred because customer confusion is unlikely, as is di-
minishment of the goodwill of either product."' However, the probability
of customer confusion increases dramatically when identical or nearly iden-
tical marks are displayed on goods that are substantially similar in function
or appearance.
In translating this rule to the gray market scenario, courts have held
that if there is even one "material" difference (defined as a difference that
consumers would likely consider in making their purchasing decision) be-
tween the imported goods and the goods produced for the domestic mar-
ket, consumer confusion is likely, the U.S. trademark holder's goodwill is
diminished, and the importation and sale of the gray market goods infringes
the U.S. mark." 6 Because manufacturers often alter products to satisfy spe-
cific preferences in different national markets, such material differences
are likely to exist in many, though not all, instances involving gray market
goods." 7 The material differences standard acts as a proxy for the likeli-
112 See Novartis AnimalHealth, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15214, at * io.
1 13 SeeNestle, 982 F.zd at 640. To a large extent, the material differences test incorporates
the notions of territoriality found generally in modern trademark law. As the First Circuit
explained, "[Tlerritorial protection kicks in under the Lanham Act where two merchants sell
physically different products in the same market and under the same name, for it is this pro-
totype that impinges on a trademark holder's goodwill and threatens to deceive consumers."
Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
114 See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Snark Prods., Inc., 19o U.S.P.Q. (BNA) oo, Io6
(TTA.B. Jan. z6, 1976).
1 15 Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641 ("[Ulsing the same mark on two blatantly different products
normally does not offend the Lanham Act, for such use is unlikely to cause confusion and is,
therefore, unlikely to imperil the goodwill of either product.").
116 Id. at 641 ("[T]he existence of any difference ... that consumers would likely con-
sider to be relevant when purchasing a product creates a presumption of consumer confusion
sufficient to support a Lanham Act claim.").
117 See Grupo Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.zd (BNA) 1531, 1533
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1996) (material difference occurred where the unauthorized goods did not
contain the same ingredient (enriched flour) or provide the required information regarding
ingredients, nutritional content, and country of origin); Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Nat'l Wholesale
Liquidators, Inc., 890 F Supp. 152, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (unauthorized goods were materially
different where they did not meet New York or California requirements regarding ingredi-
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hood of confusion test traditionally used in trademark infringement cases,
permitting gray market goods to be sold unless the goods are "materially
different" from those sold through authorized distribution channels.
A. The Underpinnings of the Material Differences Test:
Customer Confusion and the First Sale Doctrine
The material differences standard was first explicitly articulated in a 1987
decision by the Second Circuit, Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Grana-
daElectronics, Inc."s The plaintiff owned the U.S. mark CABBAGE PATCH
KIDS, and licensed Jesmar, S.A. to manufacture and distribute the dolls in
Spain. The defendant, Granada Electronics, imported the Spanish Cab-
bage Patch Kids dolls into the United States. The dolls' "birth certificates"
and "adoption papers" were in Spanish and could not be processed by the
U.S. trademark owner's fulfillment houses in the United States Thus, the
buyers of the gray market dolls could not participate in the "adoption pro-
cess" that was critical to the dolls' commercial success.119
The district court had found that the gray market dolls, "with [their]
foreign language birth certificates, adoption papers and instructions," were
materially different from the authorized dolls, which had English-language
papers. 0 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the material
differences between the authorized U.S. dolls and unauthorized foreign
dolls created consumer confusion over the source of the dolls and dimin-
ished the plaintiff's goodwill.' Even though the dolls bore genuine trade-
marks and were manufactured under license, they were not "genuine"
goods;' therefore, the sale of the dolls infringed the plaintiff's U.S. trade-
mark. 
1 3
The material differences standard, as articulated by the OriginalAppa-
lachian Artworks court and as expanded upon by later courts, is based upon
the assumption that consumers associate a trademark with goods having
certain characteristics. These consumers are likely to be confused or de-
ceived by goods bearing the same mark but having characteristics suffi-
ents).
i18 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 8 i6 E2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987).
An earlier case, Osawa &Co. v. B &HPhoto, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), suggested that
differences in point-of-sale customer service between the authorized dealer and gray market
sellers resulted in irreparable harm to the U.S. mark owner so as to support issuance of an
injunction, but did not articulate the test explicitly in terms of "material differences."
i9 Or iginalAppalachian Artworks, 816 E2d at 70-71.
izo Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 640 F. Supp. 928, 933
(S.D.N.Y. 1986),aff'd, 8i6 F2d 68 (zd Cir. I987).
121 OnginalAppalachian Artworks, 816 E 2d at 73. OriginalAppalachian Artworks arose un-





ciently different that they would likely influence the purchase decision.14
This confusion or deception can also erode the goodwill created by the U.S.
mark holder.' As the Third Circuit explained:
When the products sold by the alleged infringer and the trademark owner
contain identical marks but are materially different, consumers are likely to
be confused about the quality and nature of the trademarked goods. Charac-
teristics of the alleged infringer's goods that are not shared by the trademark
owner's goods are likely to affect consumers' perception of the desirability
of the owner's goods. Sales of the alleged infringer's goods will tarnish the
"commercial magnetism" of the trademark, injuring the trademark owner.
In such circumstances, the alleged infringer's goods are considered "non-
genuine" and the sale of the goods constitutes infringement.
2 6
As the cases demonstrate, the material differences test rests on the same
foundation of prevention of consumer confusion and protection of the
trademark owner's goodwill that underlies traditional trademark infringe-
ment.1
2 7
The material differences standard assumes that when the unauthor-
ized, imported goods are identical to the U.S. goods (for example, are of the
same grade and quality, contain the same ingredients or components, and
124 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pac. Produce, Ltd., No. 99-1326-PMP-RLH, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS I2o85, at *6 (D. Nev. May 4, 2000) ("The sale of gray market goods ... violates the
Lanham Act ... because it is likely to confuse consumers as to source, nature, or approval
for sale, of these products."). Note that no showing of actual customer confusion is required;
rather, the showing of "a material difference between goods simultaneously sold in the same
market under the same name creates a presumption of consumer confusion as a matter of law."
Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F2d 633,640 (tst Cir. 1992).
125 See Nestle, 982 F.2d at 638 ("[T]he unauthorized importation and sale of materially
different merchandise violates Lanham Act section 32 because a difference in products bear-
ing the same name confuses consumers and impinges on the local trademark holder's good-
will"); see also Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2oo F3d 775, 779 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (noting that "the consuming public, associating a trademark with goods having certain
characteristics, would be likely to be confused or deceived by goods bearing the same mark
but having materially different characteristics; this confusion or deception would also erode
the goodwill achieved by the United States trademark holder's business"); Iberia Foods Corp.
v. Romeo, 15o F3d 298,303 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The purpose of the material differences test is to
determine whether the allegedly infringing products are likely to injure the goodwill devel-
oped by the trademark owner in the trademarked goods.").
iz6 Iberia Foods, 150 E3d at 303 (citations omitted). The court stated: "The purpose
of the material differences test is to determine whether the allegedly infringing products are
likely to injure the goodwill developed by the trademark owner in the trademarked goods."
Id.
127 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. See also Gamut Trading Co., 200 F3d at
783 ("[Tlrademark law as applied to gray market goods embodies a composite of likelihood
of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods, likelihood of consumer confusion arising
from differences between the foreign and the domestic goods, impositions on the goodwill
and burdens on the integrity of the United States trademark owner due to consumer response
to any differences, and recognition of the territorial scope of national trademarks.").
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carry the same warranties and service commitments) and bear the same
true mark, consumers will not be confused as to the source or origin of the
goods and the U.S. mark holder's goodwill will not be eroded. As the Ninth
Circuit put it, "[tirademark law generally does not reach the sale of genu-
ine goods bearing a true mark even though such sale is without the mark
owner's consent,"1 28 explaining that "trademark law is designed to prevent
sellers from confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of
a product, which confusion ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article
bearing a true mark is sold."'219 For example, in Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc.
v. Dash, the Third Circuit held that because there was no risk of consumer
confusion or injury to the trademark owner's goodwill, the importation and
sale by a third party of authentic LLADRO figurines identical to those im-
ported by the U.S. trademark holder did not infringe the LLADRO trade-
mark.1 30 Similarly, in American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers, Inc.,
the court found no infringement where the parties stipulated that the alleg-
edly gray market circuit breakers were identical in specification and quality
and exhibited only non-material differences in color. 131
The material differences test also implicates the first sale doctrine and
exhaustion of trademark rights.1 3 Under the first sale doctrine, once a trade-
1z8 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 8to F2d 15o6,1 5 o9 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Polymer
Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 E2d 58, 61--62 (zd Cir. 1992) ("As a general rule, trademark law
does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though the sale is not
authorized by the mark owner. Thus, a distributor who resells trademarked goods without
change is not liable for trademark infringement." (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (ThIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. b (1995) ("[The trademark owner cannot ordinarily pre-
vent or control the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted those goods
to enter commerce. It can be said that the rights of the trademark owner are exhausted once
the owner authorizes the initial sale of the product under the trademark ... .
129 NECEIecs., 8o F.zd at 15o9.
130 Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 672 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that
"neither of the [policy] goals [of prevention of consumer confusion or injury to goodwill] is
undermined by the importation of genuine goods" because consumers "get precisely what
they believed that they were purchasing"); see also Nestle, 982 F2d at 641 ("[Wihen a product
identical to a domestic product is imported into the United States under the same mark, no
violation of the Lanham Act occurs").
131 Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers, Inc., 406 E3d 577, 585 (9th Cir. 2005).
Though color differences may be material with regard to certain consumer products, the court
did not find they would influence the purchase decision on circuit breakers.
132 The first sale doctrine is also found in copyright law, and it is codified in the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 1o9(a) (2000) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the author-
ity of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phono-
record."). The rationale behind the first sale doctrine is that after the first sale of a lawful prod-
uct, "'the policy favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to policies disfavoring
restraints of trade and limitations on the alienation of personal property .... "; see also Martin's
Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 E3d 1296, 1303 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C&C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (C.D. Cal.
1993)). The first sale doctrine in trademark law rests on similar policy considerations. Id.
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mark owner makes his or her first authorized sale of a trademarked item,
the owner has exhausted his or her trademark rights in the item sold.133
Therefore, a subsequent sale of the product by a third party will not con-
stitute trademark infringement, even if the sale is not authorized by the
trademark owner.134
As discussed above, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, the doctrine of exhaustion
developed in the context of the universality theory. Once the universality theory was sup-
planted by the territoriality theory, however, the first sale doctrine required modification, for
the territoriality theory would have little meaning if once a foreign manufacturer placed its
product into the stream of commerce its trademark rights were universally exhausted. Weil,
878 E2d at 677 n.5 (Becker, J., concurring). Rather, "[tihe more coherent way to view ex-
haustion in the context of the territoriality theory is to view it as applying individually to
each markholder such that a markholder only exhausts its own trademark rights upon sale of
the item, and not the trademark rights of other markholders in other countries." Id.; see also
Darren E. Donnelly, Comment, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the Exhaustion
of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 445 (1997) (describing the
exhaustion doctrine).
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the application of the first sale doctrine to a gray mar-
ket case brought under the Copyright Act. In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. LAnza Research
International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), L'Anza Research challenged the unauthorized sale of
its hair products. L'Anza held a copyright on the labels placed on the packaging, and it argued
that the domestic resale of the containers containing the labels violated its exclusive right to
distribute copies of its labels. The Copyright Act makes unauthorized importation of copy-
righted works illegal. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that under the "first
sale" doctrine, the copyright owner's exclusive right to sell a work stops with the first sale of
that work. The Court stated: "[Olnce the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the
stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its
distribution." Id. at 152.
133 See, e.g., Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 15o E3d 298, 301 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) ("According
to the 'first sale' or 'exhaustion' doctrine, a trademark owner's authorized initial sale of its
product into the stream of commerce extinguishes the trademark owner's rights to maintain
control over who buys, sells, and uses the product in its authorized form.").
134 See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend
beyond the first sale of the product. Resale by the first purchaser of the original article under
the producer's trademark is neither trademark infringement nor unfair competition."). This is
also the position taken by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:
[T]he trademark owner cannot ordinarily prevent or control the sale of
goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted those goods to
enter commerce. It can be said that the rights of the trademark owner
are exhausted once the owner authorizes the initial sale of the product
under the trademark or that the owner implicitly licenses others to fur-
ther market the goods under the mark.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. b (1995); see also Davidoff & Cie, S.A.
v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 E3d 1297, 1301 (1 ith Cir. 2oo1) ("The resale of genuine trademarked
goods generally does not constitute infringement. This is for the simple reason that consum-




While the first sale doctrine protects the sale of genuine goods bearing
true marks, materially different goods are not considered genuine goods.135
Unauthorized importers are not the "first seller," as they have purchased
and sold the goods .in contravention of policy or agreement, and the resale
of gray market goods is not shielded by the first sale doctrine.
3 6
B. Identifying a "Material" Difference
When is a difference "material"? The courts straddle a fine line in making
this determination. "Minimal" differences clearly will not support a gray
market claim. According to the Third Circuit, "when the differences be-
tween the products prove so minimal that consumers who purchase the
alleged infringer's goods 'get precisely what they believed that they were
purchasing,' consumers' perceptions of the trademarked goods are not
likely to be affected by the alleged infringer's sales."1 37 However, as the
First Circuit explained, consumers may be misled by subtle differences, so
"the threshold of materiality must be kept low enough to take account of
potentially confusing differences-differences that are not blatant enough
to make it obvious to the average consumer that the origin of the product
differs from his or her expectations."'' 3 8 The First Circuit went on to state:
"Any higher threshold would endanger a manufacturer's investment in
135 See supra notes 12o-z and accompanying text. See also Davidoff & Cie, 263 F.3d at
1302 (The first sale "doctrine does not hold true ... when an alleged infringer sells trade-
marked goods that are materially different than those sold by the trademark owner."); Martin's
Herend Imps., Inc., 112 E3d at 1303 (noting the first sale doctrine "applies only to identical
genuine goods"); Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 Ezd 633, 638
(Ist Cir. 1992) ("[Trademark law generally does not reach the sale of genuine goods bear-
ing a true mark even though such sale is without the mark owner's consent," but the court
also noted that this "maxim does not apply when genuine, but unauthorized, imports differ
materially from authentic goods authorized for sale in the domestic market." (citations omit-
ted)); Bulova Corp. v. Bulova do Brasil Com. Rep. Imp. & Exp. Ltda., 44 E Supp. 2d 1329,
1330 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (first sale doctrine protects resellers of genuine merchandise lawfully
acquired, but only "where there is no other conduct of infringement"); 4 McCARTHY, supra
note 24, § 29:5 1.2 ("This is only logical, because if one applied the 'first sale' or 'exhaustion'
defense to gray goods sales, the unauthorized importer would never be an infringer, because
an unauthorized importer is always a reseller of goods.").
136 Martin's HerendImps., 112 E3d at 1303 ("[Aipplying the first sale rule to an unauthor-
ized importer ... would mean that the gray-market importer would always escape liability.
Unauthorized importers are never the first seller."); see also Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589
F. Supp. 1163, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[Wlhere ... the U.S. assignee has developed a sepa-
rate goodwill factually independent from that of the mark originator, whatever exhaustion
occurred with the original release into commerce was the exhaustion of a legally distinct and
factually different mark.").
137 Iberia Foods, 15o F 3 d at 303 (quoting Weil, 878 Ezd at 672).
138 Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641; see also Davidoff& Cie, 263 F3 d at 1302 ("Because a myriad of
considerations may influence consumer preferences, the threshold of materiality must be kept
low to include even subtle differences between products.").
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product goodwill and unduly subject consumers to potential confusion by
severing the tie between a manufacturers's [sic] protected mark and its as-
sociated bundle of traits."'13 9 However, all or substantially all of the alleged
gray market goods must bear the material differences in order for a cause
of action to lie. 4'
Ultimately, the threshold for "materiality" is based upon considerations
of consumer protection and support for the integrity of the trademarks of
U.S. trademark holders. Essentially, the courts look to see whether consum-
ers would likely consider the difference to be relevant when purchasing a
product.' 4' The plaintiff need only show that consumers would be likely
to consider the differences between the foreign and domestic products to
be significant or relevant when purchasing the product; the plaintiff need
not bring in evidence of actual consumer confusion. 42 Rather, a presump-
tion of consumer confusion is triggered whenever the difference between
the genuine product and the allegedly gray market product is such that a
consumer would likely consider it relevant in a purchasing decision. 43 The
defendant may attempt to rebut the presumption, but to be successful, he
or she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the differences
are not of the type that average consumers would likely consider when
making a purchase decision.' 44
It is impossible to create a definitive list of what constitutes a "ma-
terial difference."'' 41 It is clear, however, that the differences need not be
139 Nestle, 982 F2d at 641.
140 SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 E3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2oo5), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2968 (2oo6).
141 See Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641; see also Davidoff& Cie, 263 F3d at 1302 ("A material dif-
ference is one that consumers consider relevant to a decision about whether to purchase a
product.").
142 Nestle, 982 F.zd at 640 (noting that "a showing of actual confusion is not required").
143 Id. at 641 ("We conclude that the existence of any difference between the registrant's
product and the allegedly infringing gray good that consumers would likely consider to be rel-
evant when purchasing a product creates a presumption of consumer confusion sufficient to
support a Lanham Trade-Mark Act claim.").
144 Id.
145 See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 15o F3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Because consum-
er preferences are as fickle and diverse as the human imagination, it is impossible to devise an
exhaustive list of the types of differences between products that can be considered material
for the purposes of the genuineness test."). The Customs Services has provided a non-exhaus-
tive list of material differences for Lever Rule protection purposes. 19 C.ER. § 133.2(e) (2005)
states, in relevant part:
Customs determination of physical and material differences may
include, but is not limited to, considerations of:
(i) The specific composition of both the authorized and gray
market product(s) (including chemical composition);
(2) Formulation, product construction, structure, or composite
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physical. 46 The types of differences courts have deemed to be material are
discussed below. These include differences in ingredients and aesthetic
characteristics, quality and quality control measures, warranties, and labels
or other written materials accompanying the product.
1. Differences in Ingredients, Aesthetics, and Packaging.-Perhaps the easiest
gray market cases are those where the unauthorized goods contain ingre-
dients different from those found in the authorized goods.147 For example,
the court in Grupo Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria ElMolino, Inc. easily found that
a material difference existed where the authorized product (crackers) con-
tained enriched flour, and the gray market product did not.' 8 Similarly, in
Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., the First Circuit deter-
mined that the foreign owner of the United States trademark PERUGINA
and its Puerto Rican subsidiary that imported Italian-made PERUGINA
chocolate could prevent the importation of PERUGINA chocolate made
under license in Venezuela because the two products were materially dif-
ferent in price, taste, and presentation; were subject to different quality
control measures; and were made using different ingredients. 149
Purely aesthetic differences between the authorized and unauthorized
goods can support a gray market claim. For example, in Martin's Herend
product components, of both the authorized and gray market prod-
uct;
(3) Performance and/or operational characteristics of both the au-
thorized and gray market product;
(4) Differences resulting from legal or regulatory requirements,
certification, etc.;
(5) Other distinguishing and explicitly defined factors that would
likely result in consumer deception or confusion as proscribed under
applicable law.
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lever Rule.
146 See Nestle, 982 F.2d at 639 n.7 ("We think that the appropriate test should not be
strictly limited to physical differences. Other sorts of differences-differences in, say, war-
ranty protection or service commitments-may well render products non-identical in the rel-
evant Lanham Trade-Mark Act sense"); see also SKF USA Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 423 F3d
1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding that "material differences that preclude infringement
by gray goods may be physical or nonphysical") (decided under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2968 (2oo6).
147 See, e.g., Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Nat'l Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., 890 F Supp. 152,
159- 6 o (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (material differences exist where unauthorized product contained
fewer conditioning agents, a higher level of volatile organic compounds, and differing amounts
of alcohol than did the authorized product).
148 Grupo Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1533
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1996) ("The lack of enriched flour is a material difference as consumers may
prefer a product that contains the extra vitamins and minerals contained in enriched flour.").
149 Nestle, 982 Ezd at 642-43.
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Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., the Fifth Circuit held that
the foreign owner of a U.S. trademark and a domestic distributor could pre-
vent the importation of authentic HE REND porcelain that was materially
different in color, pattern, or shape from the HEREND porcelain autho-
rized for sale in the United States.' The court stated that "[a]s a matter of
law, [aesthetic] differences are material, since consumer choices for such ar-
tistic pieces are necessarily subjective or even fanciful, depending on each
consumer's personal artistic tastes."'' This was true even though the dif-
ferences in the color, pattern, or shape of the porcelain figurines would be
readily apparent to an observer if the products were placed side-by-side. 52
Alteration of packaging or the exterior appearance of the product can
create a material difference, even if the product itself is unchanged. In Da-
vidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD International Corp., the Eleventh Circuit found
that a material difference existed when the defendant made changes to
fragrance bottles and packaging.'53 The defendant acquired fragrances in-
tended for sale overseas or in duty-free shops and, in an admitted attempt
to prevent the mark owner from identifying the defendant's source, covered
the original codes on the box bottoms with white stickers and obliterated
batch codes on the bottles with an etching tool.'54 The bottles were then
distributed through discount retail stores in the United States The court
found that etching the bottle to remove the batch code degraded the ap-
pearance of the bottle and might well lead a consumer to believe "that the
bottle had been tampered with."'55 Because the marketing of a fragrance
involves not only the product itself but the "commercial magnetism" of
the mark affixed to the bottle, the alteration of the physical appearance of
the bottle could adversely affect the U.S. mark holder's goodwill and create
a likelihood of customer confusion. 5 6 Consequently, this alteration was a
material difference that would support a trademark infringement action.
5 7
Similarly, in Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., the fact that the
gray marketer physically scarred the product and removed gold plating in
obliterating serial numbers on the product was found to be a material dif-
ference that could lead to consumer confusion.' However, the degree of
150 Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 E3 d 1296
(5th Cir. 1997)-
151 Id. at 1302.
152 Seealso Gamut Trading Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2oo F 3d 775, 781 (Fed. Cir.
1999) ("[D]ifferences that may be readily apparent to consumers may nevertheless be mate-
rial."). See generally Martin's Herend Imps., 112 E3d 1296.
153 Davidoff& Cie, SA v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297 (I ith Cir. 2001).
154 Id. at 1299.
155 Id. at 130 3.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1304.
158 Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., 172 E Supp. 2d 231, 241 (D. Mass.), claim
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alteration of the mark appears to be critical to the determination of a mate-
rial difference. In two other cases, the removal of batch codes on bottles
was done so imperceptibly that the bottles were not defaced, and the courts
found no material differences existed.1' 9
2. Differences in Quality and Quality Control Measures.-The law protects the
right to control the quality, not the actual quality of the goods themselves.
6
0
Material differences can arise where the unauthorized goods are of equal,
or even higher, quality than the authorized goods. Thus, the only relevant
question is whether the goods are materially different, not whether they
are of lesser quality. Even higher quality will not excuse a gray market
good. 161
Material differences can arise where the products are not manufactured
and distributed under the quality controls established by the U.S. trade-
mark owner. '61 As the Second Circuit stated in El Greco Leather Products Co.
v. Shoe World, Inc.: "One of the most valuable and important protections
afforded by the Lanham Act is the right to control the quality of the goods
manufactured and sold under the holder's trademark."' 63 According to the
dismissed, 175 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D. Mass 2OO1).
159 See Graham Webb Int'l Ltd. P'ship v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 916 E Supp. 9o9,
916 (E.D. Ark. 1995); John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Randalls Food Mkts., Inc., 17 S.W.3d 721, 736
(Tex. App. zooo).
16o See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 8o6 F.zd 392, 395 (2d Cit. 1986)
("[Tihe actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of quality that a trademark
holder is entitled to maintain.").
I6I See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that the
trademark holder need not show that the authorized goods are of a higher quality than the
alleged gray market goods); Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA,
Co., 112 F3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he plaintiff need not prove that the defendant's
imports are of inferior quality to establish trademark infringement, only that they are materi-
ally different.").
162 See Grupo Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 9, 1996); Helene Curtis, Inc. v. Nat'l Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 152,
157 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); El Greco Leather Prods., 806 Ead 392. But see Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v.
Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F2d 1054, 1058 n.5 (9 th Cit. 1983) (finding no possibility of
consumer confusion and no material difference where the trademark-holder's quality control
measures were met and the goods were identical to what consumers expected to purchase);
butcf Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F3d 1o83, 1o87 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving unau-
thorized domestic goods, not parallel imports); Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F3d 74,
78-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 E2d 104, 107
(4th Cir. i99I) (same).
163 El Greco Leather Prods., 806 F.zd at 395 (finding goods that had not been inspected
to ensure quality were not genuine). In El Greco Leather Products, the goods had been manu-
factured abroad by agreement of the U.S. trademark holder. The goods were then imported
into the United States for sale despite their not having been inspected in accordance with the
procedures set forth by the mark holder.
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First Circuit, "substantial variance in quality control ... creates a presump-
tion of customer confusion as a matter of law."'"
However, the quality control measures must be real, not mere window-
dressing, in order to satisfy the material differences standard. 165 For ex-
ample, in CPC International, Inc. v. Blandito Food Distributing Corp., where
the content of the unauthorized goods (corn oil) was identical to the autho-
rized goods and there was no evidence that the mark holder ever inspected
the containers of either the domestic or the foreign products once they
left the manufacturing plant, no material difference arose.'" Similarly, in
Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, the Third Circuit rejected the contention that
the trademark owner's superficial inspection of the packaging of autho-
rized imports of a household cleaner constituted a material difference.
67
The trademark owner had no knowledge of the contents or ingredients of
the product, and so the owner limited its inspection to "self-evident" de-
fects.' 1 The court stated that the trademark owner's "hands off" approach
had reduced its quality control inspection to a de minimis check designed
to make sure the products involved were not obviously unmarketable.
69
Because distributors and retailers already have incentives to prevent obvi-
ously defective goods from reaching the hands of consumers, the Third
Circuit reasoned that the limited inspection done by the trademark holder
did not create a material difference between the authorized and unauthor-
ized goods.170
The quality control implications of unauthorized distribution of the
product can also lead to a material difference. In Bayer Corp. v. Custom
School Frames, LLC, for example, the fact that gray market flea-control
products were distributed on-line directly to consumers, without consulta-
tion with a licensed veterinarian as required for the sale of the authorized
goods, was deemed a material difference. 7' Similarly, in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pa-
164 Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 643 (ist Cir.
1992); see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pac. Produce, Ltd., No. 99-1326-PMP-RLH, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS i2o85, at *8 (D. Nev. May 4, 2000) (finding gray-market beverages not subject to au-
thorized trademark holder's quality control procedures are materially different); Philip Morris,
Inc. v. Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 844, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that gray-mar-
ket cigarettes not subject to the plaintiff's quality control programs are materially different);
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Nationwide Equip., 877 F. Supp. 61 1, 615 (M.D. Fla. t994) (holding that
differences in quality control methods are material).
165 Iberia Foods, i5o F3d at 304 ("'[Qluality control' is not a talisman the mere utterance
of which entitles the trademark owner to judgment.").
166 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Blandito Food Distrib. Corp., 835 E Supp. 636, 638 (S.D. Fla.
1993).




171 Bayer Corp. v. Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 (E.D. La. 2003);
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cific Produce, Ltd., the court found material differences in quality control
where unauthorized products were sold outside authorized distribution
channels because the mark-holder was unable "to properly and sufficiently
exercise quality control such as... placing 'drink by' notice dates on the
[unauthorized] product, monitoring the [unauthorized] product for proper
shipment and storage conditions, proper arrangement of retail [unauthor-
ized] product displays and rotating stale, damaged or substandard quality
[unauthorized] product off the retail shelves."'7 2 Likewise, in Philip Mor-
ris, Inc. v. Allen Distributors, Inc., the mark holder's quality control program,
which consisted of visiting authorized distributors to inspect products for
damage, staleness, or other quality issues, was improperly subverted when
the goods were sold through non-authorized channels.'73
By contrast, in American Home Products v. Reliance Trading Co., no ma-
terial differences were found when non-prescription health care products
were shipped abroad, then imported back into the United States. 7 4 The
court noted that the products were manufactured for the U.S. market, were
inspected and approved by the FDA, were undamaged in transit, and were
still in their original sealed packaging.' The mere transshipment of the
goods, standing alone, did not constitute a material difference. 7 6 The court
in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Giraud, on the other hand, found that "the possible ill
effects on the packaging due to transhipment [sic] without adequate provi-
sions for inspections" created a material difference in products authorized
for sale in Venezuela but diverted for sale in Puerto Rico.
177
3. Differences in Labeling, Manuals, and other Written Materials.-Differences
in labeling, instruction manuals, and other written materials may be mate-
rial even where the difference is so striking as to be obvious to a relatively
oblivious consumer, such as a label or manual being written in a foreign lan-
guage. 17s The Federal Circuit addressed this issue in 1999 in Gamut Trading
see also Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751, 1755 (D. Kan. Sept.
7, 2004) (distribution without consultation with a veterinarian was a material difference).
172 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pac. Produce, Ltd., No. 9 9 -13 26-PMP-RCH, 2ooo U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12o85, at *4 (D. Nev. May 4, 2000).
173 Philip Morris Inc. v. Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 844,848 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
174 Am. Home Prods. v. Reliance Trading Co., 55 U.S.P.Q.zd (BNA) 1756 (C.D. Cal. July
14, 2000).
175 Id. at 176o-62.
176 Id. at 1761 ("[T]he fact that the goods have traveled overseas in no way renders them
materially different. At most, the goods have lost part of their shelf-life ....").
177 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Giraud, 7 U.S.P.Q.ad (BNA) 137
, 1373 (D.P.R. Mar. 17, 1988). Other
material differences cited by the court were the differences in can size and interference with
local promotional advertising campaigns. Id.
178 See, e.g., Gamut Trading Co. v U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 2oo F3d 775, 781-82 (Fed.
Cit. 1999) (foreign language "instructional and warning labels, operator manuals, and service
manuals" were materially different); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading Inc., 753 F. Supp.
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Co. v. United States International Trade Commission.79 The defendant had im-
ported used Kubota tractors from Japan for sale in the United States. These
tractors had Japanese-language instructional and warning labels, operator
manuals, and service manuals. s The court noted that while the foreign-
language labels would be obvious to a U.S. consumer, the consumer might
not realize that he or she was not purchasing an authorized tractor or that
parts and service were not available for the tractors from Kubota-US dealer-
ships. '8 Subsequent remedial measures by the importer will not overcome
a finding of material differences if those differences existed at the time of
importation. For example, placing English-language labels on tractors af-
ter importation did not negate the fact that material differences existed at
the time of importation. 8 ' Similarly, in Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. United States
International Trade System, the Federal Circuit noted that the allegation of
material differences caused by the inclusion of foreign language operators
manuals was not overcome by the seller providing English-language manu-
als to purchasers of gray market harvesters; rather, it "serve[d] to heighten
confusion" as the foreign- and English-language manuals contained dif-
fering information as a result of other differences between the products
produced for the two markets.
183
Even the use of non-American spellings of English-language words has
been found to be a material difference."84 In NovartisAnimalHealth U.S. Inc.
v. L.M. Connelly &Sons, Pty. Ltd., labels that "were tailored to medicines for
sale in Australia, as shown by use of Australian spellings, use of the metric
system, and inclusion of information pertaining to the Australian market,"
1240, 1243-44 (D.N.J.) (describing material differences in the print and label contents of "Tic-
Tac" candies), aff'd, 935 Ezd 1281 (3d Cir.), andrev'd, 952 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. '99') (reversing
only the award of attorney fees); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc.,
816 Ed 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1987) (Spanish language instructions and "adoption papers" for dolls
created a material difference); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pac. Produce, Ltd., No. 99-1326-PMP-RCH,
2ooo U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12o85, at *9 (D. Nev. May 4, 2000) (Spanish labeling was a material
difference); Fender Musical Instruments Corp. v. Unlimited Music Ctr., Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1053, 1o56 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 1995) (guitars that came with only a Japanese-lan-
guage owner's manual were materially different); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Nostalgia Prods. Corp., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1404, 1405 (N.D. II1. Dec. 20, 199o) (labels that were in Spanish and that
lacked an ingredient listing were materially different); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589
E Supp. 1163, 1 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that foreign language instruction manuals have
caused "understandable consumer dissatisfaction").
179 Gamut Trading Co., zoo E3d 775 (arising under Section 337 of the Tariff Act).
i8o Id. at 78 1.
181 Id.
182 In re Certain Agric. Tractors Under 50 Power Take-off Horsepower, 44 U.S.P.Q.zd
(BNA) 1385 (U.S. ITC Mar. 12, 1997).
183 Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 444 E3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6).
184 See Bayer Corp. v. Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 (E.D. La.




were found to create material differences."'5 However, in CPC International,
Inc. v. Blandito Food Distributing Corp., the court found no material differ-
ence where an English-language label was added to the rear of containers
of corn oil originally intended for the Puerto Rican market.186 The court
found no evidence that consumers were confused or misled by the packag-
ing and, in fact, found evidence that dual-language containers were benefi-
cial to Hispanic consumers." 7
Clearly, the unavailability of a warranty is a material difference 118 -- a
consumer who anticipated receiving the warranty afforded authorized
goods but who received no warranty or a limited warranty as a result of pur-
chasing gray market goods would certainly be disappointed. However, in
Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., the court found no material differ-
ence where the seller of unauthorized goods matched the warranty offered
by the mark owner." 9
While the lack of a warranty is a fairly obvious difference, other differ-
ences between authorized and unauthorized goods may be more subtle. In
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Allen Distributors, Inc., the defendant had distributed
unauthorized Marlboro cigarettes in the United States. 19 While the un-
authorized cigarettes themselves were identical to those produced by the
U.S. trademark holder, 9' the packaging for the foreign Marlboros did not
contain the Universal Product Codes (UPCs) used on the domestic packag-
ing that permitted the consumer to participate in a merchandise redemp-
tion program. This difference was considered material enough to support
the grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff.92 Other differences
in the packaging, however, including the inclusion of the phrase "U.S. Tax
185 Novartis Animal Health US, Inc. v. LM Connelly & Sons, Pry. Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 10213
(BSJ) (RLF), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15214, at *i 1-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2005).
i86 CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Blandito Food Distrib. Corp., 835 F. Supp. 636, 637-38 (S.D. Fla.
1993).
187 Id. at 638.
188 See Fender Musical Instruments Corp. v. Unlimited Music Ctr., Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1053, 1056 (D. Conn. Feb. 16, 1995).
189 Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240-41 & n.io (D.
Mass. 2001). The seller did not provide the mark owner's service manual as a result of a settle-
ment agreement reached with the mark owner in a previous copyright infringement action. Id.
at 240. The court did find other material differences existed in the "appearance and integrity
of the products" and the impact on the mark owner's "ability to maintain quality control." Id.
at 241.
I9O Philip Morris, Inc. v. Allen Distribs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 844 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
191 In fact, the unauthorized cigarettes were manufactured in the United States by an
affiliated company. The court noted that the goods at issue had been manufactured in the
United States rather than abroad as would be typical in a gray market case. While that fact
"casts some doubt on the viability" of the mark holder's claims, the court found it did not
prevent the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 852.
192 Id. at 853. The court also noted that the goods were not subject to the plaintiff's qual-
ity control measures. Id. at 848.
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Exempt for Use Outside the U.S." and the use of the name "Philip Morris
Products, Inc." instead of "Philip Morris, Inc." were considered not to be
material because the court deemed them to be unlikely "to affect consum-
ers' expectations."' 9 3
Finally, the courts have found gray market goods whose labels do not
comply with state or federal labeling requirements to be materially differ-
ent. In Bayer Corp. v. Custom School Frames, LLC, gray market flea-control
products that did not display an EPA registration number as required by
federal law were deemed materially different.'
IV. CONCLUSION
As noted above,' 95 there are competing policy arguments for prohibiting or
allowing the importation and sale of gray market products. Manufacturers
and distributors argue that they should be able to control the use of their
marks, that gray market goods diminish the value of their marks, that eco-
nomic benefit from legal exclusive distribution arrangements is undercut
by gray market goods, that gray marketers provide unfair competition that
free-rides on marketing and advertising expenditures made by legitimate
sellers, and that consumers may be misled and disappointed by gray market
goods. In short, they argue that gray market goods undercut the twin goals
of the Lanham Act-preventing consumer confusion and protecting the
mark holder's goodwill. Those sitting on the other side of the gray market
fence argue that consumers benefit from the price competition created by
gray market goods, that gray market goods are genuine and bear legitimate
marks, and that consumers are not confused as to the source or origin of the
goods purchased.
While an in-depth analysis of these policy arguments is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is interesting that Congress has not seen fit to ad-
j93 Id. at 853 n.Io; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Pac. Produce, Ltd., No. 99-1326-PMP-RLH,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12o85, at *4 (D. Nev. May 4, 2000) (material differences existed where
unauthorized product did not inform purchasers of or allow purchasers to participate in pro-
motions based on purchases of specially-marked authorized goods).
194 Bayer Corp. v. Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 E Supp. 2d 503, 508 (E.D. La. 2003);
see also Bayer Healthcare, LLC v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.PQ.zd (BNA) 1751 1755 (D. Kan. Sept.
7, 2004) (noting that failure to comply with state or federal environmental law is a material
difference); PepsiCo., zooo U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12085, at *7 (failure to comply with FDA label-
ing requirements is a material difference); Grupo Gamesa S.A. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531, 1533 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 1996) (failure to comply with U.S. Customs
regulations and state and federal requirements is a material difference); Helene Curtis v. Nat'l
Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., 890 F Supp. 152, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting preliminary
injunction to prevent importation of unauthorized goods because, inter alia, goods failed to
comply with FDA labeling requirements); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 1240, Iz44 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 935 F2d 1281 (3d Cir.), andrev'd, 952 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991)
(reversing only the award of attorney fees).
195 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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dress these policy arguments legislatively. No statute clearly governs the
sale of gray market goods. Instead, current statutory provisions provide an
incomplete patchwork scheme of protection for U.S. mark holders seeking
protection from gray market products. Two of these provisions-Section
526 of the Tariff Act and Section 42 of the Lanham Act-create mecha-
nisms to bar the importation of prohibited goods. Two other provisions-
Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act-provide remedies for trademark
infringement caused by the sale of gray market goods. None of these sec-
tions were specifically written with the gray market problem in mind, and
gray market complainants have had to work hard to fit their claims into this
statutory framework.
Despite the uneasy fit, the application of these provisions appears to
have provided a sort of safety valve that has addressed many of the con-
cerns raised by gray market activities and that has prevented the build-up
of the type of pressure necessary to trigger legislative action. Given that
gray market causes of action do not fit neatly into the traditional infringe-
ment paradigms, is the application of these provisions legitimate? In par-
ticular, is the creation and application of the "material differences" stan-
dard appropriate?
The courts have used the material differences standard to allow goods
legally sold under a mark to effectively be treated as if they were in fact un-
authorized goods competing with goods sold under that same mark. Thus,
materially different goods are not subject to the common control exception
to Section 526 of the Tariff Act or the affiliate exception of Section 42 of
the Lanham Act. Similarly, a materially different gray market good can be
deemed to be infringing upon a mark under Sections 32 and 43 of the Lan-
ham Act even though the mark is legally affixed to the gray market good.
Despite this apparent anomaly, the treatment of materially different
gray market goods is consistent with the Lanham Act's traditional focus
on prevention of consumer confusion and protection of the mark holder's
goodwill. The courts have done the best they can to protect consumers and
to provide relief to holders of U.S. registered marks given the imprecise
and incomplete statutory scheme within which they must act.
For the mark holder, the lesson seems to be that it may achieve some
measure of protection from gray market goods by contractually requiring
material differences in ingredients, aesthetic characteristics, packaging, or
quality in goods licensed for sale outside the United States. By creating a
material difference, the mark holder creates a mechanism for seeking legal
relief in the event that a gray market arises. For the courts, the focus must
be on whether the goals of the Lanham Act are furthered by application
of the material differences standard, or whether the mark holder seeks to
overemphasize differences to obtain a protection from gray market goods
that Congress has not yet been willing to extend.
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